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THE “LONG ARM” OF THE LAW: OBTAINING PERSONAL
JURISDICTION OVER A PARENT COMPANY IN COLORADO
Under a new personal jurisdiction test in Colorado for out-of-state
parent companies, plaintiffs now face a heavy factual burden and in some
situations might be priced out of bringing a suit. In Griffith v. SSC Pueblo Belmont Operation Co.1 and Meeks v. SSC Colorado Springs Colonial
Columns Operating Co.,2 the Colorado Supreme Court promulgated a
test to apply when determining whether a court has personal jurisdiction
over a parent company that does not have minimum contacts within the
state.3 The Supreme Court held that a court may obtain personal jurisdiction through imputing a subsidiary company’s jurisdiction onto the parent company.4 To impute personal jurisdiction, a court must find sufficient justification to pierce the subsidiary company’s corporate veil.5
Otherwise, a court must evaluate the personal jurisdiction of each entity
separately.6 The Supreme Court imposes a heavy factual burden on the
plaintiff, which incentivizes parent companies to form many layers of
limited liability entities not distinct from itself. To prove this conclusion,
this article will first examine the Supreme Court’s holding in Griffith and
Meeks and then argue that the holdings in both cases force a plaintiff to
satisfy a heavy factual burden and incur additional costs, which in turn
incentivizes parent companies to form multiple entities without making
each distinct from the parent company.
I. BACKGROUND
Under Colorado Law, a court may have personal jurisdiction over
an individual in any cause of action arising from a business transaction,
tort, real property dispute,7 or the maintenance of matrimonial domicile.8
“In enacting [the] long-arm statute, the Colorado legislature intended to
extend the jurisdiction of [the] courts to the fullest extent permitted by
the due process clause of the United States Constitution.”9 This “longarm statute” enables Colorado Courts to obtain jurisdiction over entities
1. 2016 CO 60M, as modified on denial of reh'g (Oct. 17, 2016).
2. 2016 CO 61 (Sept. 26, 2016).
3. Griffith v. SSC Pueblo Belmont Operation Co., 2016 CO 60M, ¶ 1, as modified on denial
of reh’g (Oct. 17, 2016); Meeks v. SSC Colorado Springs Colonial Columns Operating Co., 2016
CO 61, ¶ 6 (Colo. Sept. 26, 2016).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. The real property must be situated in the State of Colorado. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-1-124
(stating that a court may have personal jurisdiction on “any cause of action arising from[] [t]he
ownership, use or possession of any real property situated in [Colorado].”).
8. Id.
9. Le Manufacture Francaise Des Pnematiques Michelin v. Dist. Court In & for Jefferson
Cty, 620 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Colo. 1980).
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as well as individuals so long as the nonresident defendant has minimum
contacts.10 Some examples of such minimum contacts are “having agency relationships within the forum state or placing products into the
stream of commerce.”11 Both Griffith and Meeks address the problem of
obtaining personal jurisdiction over a parent company where the parent
company does not have minimum contacts.12
A. Griffith
In Griffith, the personal representative of the Estate of Antonio
Jimenez, Jr. filed a complaint against eleven parties comprised of nine
entities and two individuals.13 The suit alleges that one of the entities,
SSC Pueblo Belmont Operating Company, was negligent and that the
entity’s negligence caused the wrongful death of Mr. Jimenez.14 The
other entities included in the suit are layers in “a complex organizational
structure” where one entity would be a wholly owned subsidiary of another entity which is also a wholly owned subsidiary of a different entity.15 The problem in Griffith is that not all the entities are residents of
Colorado or have minimum contacts to establish personal jurisdiction.16
To obtain personal jurisdiction, the trial court applied a distinct entity
test.17 After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the trial court determined
that all nine entities were not distinct from each other and therefore the
subsidiary company’s (SSC Pueblo Belmont Operating Company) jurisdiction could be imputed onto the remaining entities.18
The Colorado Supreme Court rejected the trial court’s distinct entity
test.19 Instead, it held that a trial court must find sufficient justification to
pierce the corporate veil to impute personal jurisdiction.20 If the corporate veil cannot be pierced, then a trial court must determine personal
jurisdiction separately for each entity.21 The Court examined three ways
in which to pierce the corporate veil: “when (1) the entity is ‘merely the
alter ego’ of the member, (2) the LLC form is used to perpetuate a
wrong, and (3) disregarding the legal entity would achieve an equitable
result.”22 To establish that an entity is an alter ego, the Supreme Court

10. Griffith, ¶ 20 (citing Magill v. Ford Motor Co., 2016 CO 57, ¶ 14, 25 (Colo. Sept. 12,
2016) reh'g denied (Oct. 3, 2016)).
11. Magill, ¶ 25.
12. Griffith, ¶ 2; Meeks, ¶ 2.
13. Griffith, ¶ 2.
14. Id.
15. Id. at ¶ 3.
16. Id. at ¶ 2.
17. Id. at ¶ 6.
18. Id.
19. Id. at ¶ 15–16.
20. Id. at ¶ 10.
21. Id. at ¶ 10.
22. Id. at ¶ 12 (citing In re Phillips, 139 P.3d 639, 644 (Colo. 2006)).
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introduced a list of factors that a trial court should consider before coming to its determination.23 The factors to consider are:
(1) The parent owns all the stock; (2) both have common directors
and officers; (3) the parent finances the subsidiary; (4) the parent
causes the subsidiary's incorporation; (5) the subsidiary has grossly
inadequate capital; (6) the parent pays salaries or expenses of the
subsidiary; (7) the subsidiary has no business except with its parent
or subsidiary corporation or no assets except those transferred by its
parent or subsidiary; (8) directors and officers do not act independently in the interests of the subsidiary; (9) formal legal requirements of the subsidiary such as keeping corporate minutes are not
observed; (10) distinctions between the parent and subsidiary . . . are
disregarded or confused; (11) subsidiaries do not have full board[s]
24
of directors.

The Supreme Court concluded its opinion by remanding the case
back to the trial court to determine whether personal jurisdiction over the
non-resident entities is warranted under the new test.25
B. Meeks
Meeks also concerns whether a trial court can impute personal jurisdiction over a non-resident parent company.26 Like Griffith, there was a
“complex organizational structure,” and the trial court did not have jurisdiction over all of the entities.27 The trial court in Meeks also applied a
distinct entity test when determining personal jurisdiction.28 Like Griffith, the trial court found that the entities were not distinct and imputed
personal jurisdiction onto the other companies.29 The trial court in Meeks
did not conduct an evidentiary hearing before coming to its conclusion.30
The Supreme Court disagreed with the trial court’s choice not to conduct
an evidentiary hearing and by applying the distinct entity test.31
II. ARGUMENT
The Colorado Supreme Court’s holding in Griffith and Meeks failed
to recognize that the distinct entity test has the same goal as the alter ego

23. Id. at ¶ 13 (quoting Luckett v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 618 F.2d 1373, 1378 n.4 (10th Cir.
1980) (citing Fish v. East, 114 F.2d 177, 191 (10th Cir. 1940) (applying Colorado law))).
24. Id. (quoting Luckett, 618 F.2d at 1378 n.4 (citing Fish, 114 F.2d at 191 (applying Colorado law))).
25. Id. at ¶ 23.
26. Meeks v. SSC Colorado Springs Colonial Columns Operating Co., 2016 CO 61, ¶ 1
(Colo. Sept. 26, 2016).
27. See id. at ¶ 2 (“The facts of this case are similar to those in Griffith.”); see also Griffith, ¶
2–3.
28. Meeks, ¶ 3.
29. Id.; Griffith, ¶ 6.
30. Meeks, ¶ 3.
31. Id. at ¶ 8, 13.
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test and failed to recognize the additional costs and incentives associated
with requiring a more fact-intensive alter ego test.32
A. Distinct Entity v. Alter Ego
The Supreme Court believes that the distinct entity test is different
from an alter ego test.33 However, both tests have the same goal of imputing jurisdiction if the entities are not separate from each other.34 The
alter ego analysis and the distinct entity test both are applied to conclude
that companies are one in the same.35 The difference between the two is
that the alter ego test requires a court to examine multiple factors before
imputing personal jurisdiction.36 The trial court in Griffith reasoned “that
the entities all ‘operated the Colorado nursing home as one business in
which they collectively controlled the operations, planning, management,
and budget of [Belmont Lodge] in Colorado.’”37 While not explicitly
relying on the factors included in the alter ego test, it is reasonable to
assume that the trial court came to its decision by taking into account
some, if not all, of the factors that are in the alter ego test.38 While the
Supreme Court disagreed with the trial court’s use of the distinct entity
test, the trial court followed the same underlying reasoning as the alter
ego test.36
In Meeks, the Supreme Court disapproved that the trial court did not
conduct an evidentiary hearing before imputing personal jurisdiction on
the nonresident entities.39 Both Griffith and Meeks show that the Supreme Court wants trial courts to conduct extensive fact-finding when
determining whether to impute personal jurisdiction.40 These rulings indicate that the reasoning behind the distinct entity test is valid, but that
the party alleging personal jurisdiction has a burden of providing an extensive factual record which satisfies the list of factors in the alter ego
test.
B. Ramifications
While it is likely that a trial court already considers some, if not all,
of the factors laid out in Griffith, now a trial court must explicitly refer32. See Id. at ¶ 7; see Griffith, ¶ 21.
33. Id.
34. See Griffith, ¶ 4–6, 13.
35. Id.
36. Id. at ¶ 13 (quoting Luckett v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 618 F.2d 1373, 1378 n.4 (10th Cir.
1980) (citing Fish v. East, 114 F.2d 177, 191 (10th Cir. 1940) (applying Colorado law))).
37. Id. at ¶ 6.
38. See Id. at ¶ 6, 13 (quoting Luckett, 618 F.2d at 1378 n.4 (citing Fish, 114 F.2d at 191
(applying Colorado law))).
36. Id. at ¶ 6.
39. Meeks v. SSC Colorado Springs Colonial Columns Operating Co., 2016 CO 61, ¶ 10–11
(Colo. Sept. 26, 2016).
40. Id.; see Griffith, ¶ 13 (requiring a court to examine eleven factors before determining that
a subsidiary company is acting as an alter ego).
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ence each of the eleven factors the Supreme Court provides. This list of
factors creates a high factual bar for a trial court to leap over before determining personal jurisdiction. The problem with having such a stringent factual requirement is that the process will take time to establish if a
subsidiary is really an alter ego of a parent company because of the combative nature of the discovery process.41 This time frame drastically increases when a plaintiff wishes to bring in many different entities like the
scenario in Griffith and Meeks. This burden means that plaintiffs will
incur more costs when trying to bring in other nonresident parent companies.
While one must respect the Supreme Court’s ruling as protecting
the purpose of having a limited liability entity, that being to limit the
liability of the entity’s members, one must also consider whether a distinction should be made when an LLC has multiple layers of ownership
like in Griffith and Meeks. While this rule makes perfect sense when an
LLC has only one layer of ownership, it creates too heavy of a burden for
a plaintiff when an LLC has multiple layers of ownership. This burden
on the plaintiffs also creates an incentive for parent companies to create
many layers of ownership. Hypothetically, a company can limit its liability and operate its subsidiaries like an “alter ego” without worrying about
the repercussions because of the increased costs associated with attempting to pierce the corporate veil using an alter ego theory. Large companies with multiple layers of limited liability entities operating as alter
egos will have less risk of being dragged to court because of the time and
costs associated with trying to prove an alter ego theory. So while the
Supreme Court’s ruling is reasonable when looking at a layer of limited
liability that does not extend past one level of ownership, the test is unreasonable when applying the Supreme Court’s test to a subsidiary with a
“complex organizational structure.”
III. CONCLUSION
While both the rulings in Griffith and Meeks attempt to balance the
interests of both limited liability members and plaintiffs, the Colorado
Supreme Court created a test to impute jurisdiction on parent companies
that creates a substantial factual burden which in turn incentivizes parent
companies to form many subsidiaries and operate them as alter egos.
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41. See Richard P. Holme, Colorado's New Rules of Civil Procedure, Part I: Case Management and Disclosure, 23 COLO. LAW. 2467, 2468–69 (1994) (discussing the change of the rule
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